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SEQUENTIAL VERSUS UNITARY TRIALS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS  
William M. Landes*  
I. Introduction 
 
When Polaroid successfully sued Kodak for infringing its patents on instant 
photography, the question of damages was litigated in a separate trial and before a 
different judge than the one who found Kodak liable for infringing Polaroids patents.1 
A bifurcated or sequential trial on liability and damages, as opposed to a unitary 
trial on both issues, is the exception rather than the norm. This may appear puzzling 
since bifurcation can avoid costly litigation over the amount of damages if the 
defendant is not found liable or if the parties settle damages once liability is established. 
What explains the infrequency of bifurcated trials on liability and damages? Have 
courts failed to adopt more efficient methods of litigation, or are there offsetting 
disadvantages of bifurcation? One possible answer is that evidence on the nature and 
extent of damages also bears on the question of the defendants liability so that savings 
from bifurcation are negligible. Another is that bifurcation may require additional court 
time and repetition of evidence, resulting in cost diseconomies rather than cost savings. 
A more subtle explanation is that bifurcation may increase the number of lawsuits 
brought and reduce the fraction that settle out of court compared to a unitary trial. If so, 
bifurcation may increase overall litigation costs even though it lowers the cost of 
litigating a given dispute.2  
A sequential trial is not limited to separating liability and damages. Any potentially 
dispositive issue or issues can be separated. More formally, a sequential trial breaks a 
trial into n (≥ 2) potentially dispositive issues; litigates and decides issue 1; litigates 
and decides issue 2 conditional on the plaintiff winning issue 1; litigates and 
                                                                                                                                                             
*Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Lucian 
Bebchuk, Steve Gilles, Richard Epstein, Keith Hylton, Elisabeth M. Landes, Mitch Polinsky, Richard 
Posner, Steve Schulhofer and Steve Shavell for their many helpful comments on an earlier draft, 
Kazuhiko Sano for his valuable research assistance and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its 
generous support. 
1See Polaroid v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828 (D. Mass. 1985) and 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1711(D. 
Mass. 1990) for the liability and damages trials respectively. 
2With respect to tort suits, another argument advanced against bifurcation is that it may prevent 
juries from reaching compromise verdicts in which damages are reduced to take account of the victims 
negligence even though contributory negligence bars any recovery. I consider this question later when I 
analyze the relation between bifurcation and the probability the plaintiff wins his suit. 
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decides issue 3 conditional on the plaintiff winning issues 1 and 2 and so forth.3  
For example, a trial court might first decide at the pleadings stage if the court has 
jurisdiction over the controversy or defendant; if it does, it next decides whether the 
statute of limitations bars the plaintiffs suit; if the plaintiff prevails on the latter 
question, the court then considers the merits of the case. A court might also separate 
more substantive issues. To illustrate, a court might first decide whether the defendant 
manufactured the allegedly defective product and whether the product caused the 
injuries before considering liability and damages. Or in a criminal case, the question 
whether the defendant committed the crime may be decided before considering an 
insanity defense.4 Just as bifurcation of liability and damages creates the possibility of 
cost savings so does the separation of any dispositive issue before considering evidence 
on the remaining trial issues.  
To avoid confusion, I use the term bifurcation to denote a sequential trial that 
separates liability and damages; the term separation to denote a sequential trial on 
two or more dispositive issues; and the term unitary to describe a trial in which all 
issues are presented before deciding the case. A sequential trial can involve the same or 
different decision makers on the separate issues. I discuss this briefly when I examine 
possible diseconomies from bifurcation.  
The analysis in this paper builds on and extends the now standard model of the 
resolution of legal disputes.5 The simple insight of this paper is that in many instances, a 
sequential trial lowers the expected cost of litigation compared to a unitary trial for both the 
plaintiff and defendant and, therefore (1) increases the plaintiffs incentive to sue; (2) increases 
the number of lawsuits; and (3) reduces the likelihood that the parties will settle out of court by 
narrowing the range of mutually acceptable settlements. Hence, sequential decision-making 
may increase the aggregate cost of litigation even though it lowers the expected cost of 
litigating (as opposed to settling) a particular dispute.  
                                                                                                                                                             
3This definition is oversimplified because the plaintiff may claim the defendant has committed 
several wrongful acts. Hence, even if the plaintiff loses issue 1, that may only dispose of part of his case 
and thus further issues will still be litigated. To simplify the analysis, I use the definition given in the text. 
4Trial courts appear to have wide discretion to separate issues. For example, Rule 42(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate 
trial of any claim, counterclaim or issue. Most states have statutes similar to Rule 42(b). See Note, Rule 
42(b)  Bifurcation of the Issues of Liability and Damages at Trial, 5 U. Ark.Little Rock L. J. 405, 406 n.50 
(1982). For a more complete list of issues suitable for a separate trial see Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or 
Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 Minn. L. Rev., 743 (1955) 
and The Mini-Trial:Bifurcation as an Efficient Device to Promote the Resolution of Civil Cases, 53 Albany 
Law Review, 19 (1988). 
5See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); John P. 
Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); and Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973).  
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Although there is a voluminous law and economics literature on the resolution of 
legal disputes, I am unaware of any systematic economic analysis of bifurcation or 
separate trials.6 In an insightful paper that predates the economic literature, Warren 
Schwartz explains how the severance of liability and damage issues can lower the cost 
of litigation and increase the incentive to litigate rather than settle cases.7 Schwartzs 
reasoning is similar to mine although his analysis is less formal. A paper by Bradford 
Cornell comes closest to the approach taken here.8 Cornell uses an option-pricing model 
to analyze the plaintiffs incentive to sue, and shows that the expected value of suing 
(and hence the incentive to sue) will increase if the plaintiff has the option of 
terminating the suit without penalty before incurring the full cost of litigation. Similarly, 
I show that bifurcation or separation increases the expected value of the plaintiffs claim 
and decreases the expected value of the defendants liability because it holds out the 
prospect of saving litigation expenditures. This, in turn, raises the minimum sum the 
plaintiff will settle for, lowers the defendants maximum settlement offer, and reduces 
the likelihood that the parties will settle. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part I develops a formal model of a sequential 
trial. I begin with a simple example where the parties expect to settle damages 
conditional on the plaintiff winning liability. Next I examine the case where the parties 
expect to litigate damages conditional on the plaintiff winning liability. I then compare 
these cases to a unitary trial in which I allow for the possibility that the parties may find 
it mutually beneficial to stipulate to damages and litigate liability only. Part II examines 
related questions such as diseconomies of scope from bifurcation; the possibility that 
bifurcation will prejudice one of the parties; and the possibility of litigating damages 
before liability. In Part III I analyze a sequential trial that involves many potentially 
dispositive issues. Here, I look not only at the question of how many issues to separate 
but also at factors that should determine the sequence in which to separate issues. In 
Part IV I present some concluding remarks.  
I. The Model 
A trial involves a sequence of actions. In the case of a bifurcated trial on liability and 
damages, the sequence is as follows. (1) The plaintiff first decides whether to sue the 
defendant. I assume he will sue only if the expected value of litigating his claim through 
                                                                                                                                                             
6In their excellent survey article, Cooter and Rubinfeld (see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Lit 1067 (1989)) do not discuss the 
subject of bifurcated or separate trials although they survey more than 100 law and economics articles on 
the subject of legal dispute resolution.  
7Warren F, Schwartz, SeveranceA Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in 
Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1197 (1967). 
8Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. Legal Stud. 173 (1990). 
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trial net of litigation cost is positive.9 (2) If the plaintiff sues, he and the defendant must 
decide whether to settle before trial or to litigate the question of the defendants liability 
(in the case of a bifurcated trial). I assume that the parties will settle if it is mutually 
beneficial to do so. That is, if a settlement can make each party better off than his 
expected outcome from a trial, the parties will settle. (3) Provisionally, I assume that if 
the parties settle liability, the litigation ends. Later, I consider the possibility of a partial 
settlement in which the parties stipulate to the defendants liability but litigate the 
amount of damages. (4) If liability is tried and the defendant wins, that also ends the 
litigation although the defendant may still pay something rather than risk losing on 
appeal. (To simplify, I assume that payment is zero.) (5) If the plaintiff wins, the parties 
then decide whether to settle or litigate the amount of damages. Again, I assume that 
the parties will settle damages when it is mutually beneficial.  
A. Definitions and Assumptions 
Let A and B denote the plaintiff (victim) and defendant (injurer) respectively. Define 
 pa, pb   = plaintiffs and defendants estimates of probability of   
  plaintiff winning liability  
 Ja, Jb   = plaintiffs and defendants estimates of damage   
  award  
 Js|w  = amount parties expect to settle for conditional on   
  plaintiff winning liability in a bifurcated trial 
 Js|u  = amount parties stipulate to in a unitary trial.  a, b      
 = plaintiffs and defendants cost of a trial on both    
 liability and damages 
 ea, eb  = plaintiffs and defendants expected settlement    
  surplus 
 c           = total cost of trial on both liability and damages (c = a   
  + b) 
 k            = fraction (<1) of a, b and c incurred in liability phase   
  of trial 
 1-k         = fraction of a, b and c incurred in damage phase of  
                                                                                                                                                             
9This is a standard assumption in the literature on legal decision making. It implies that the plaintiff 
is willing to bring a suit only if he is willing to go to trial if settlement discussions fail. This assumption 
eliminates the possibility of suits which have a negative expected value to the plaintiff but are brought to 
extract a settlement. Several recent papers, however, have addressed the question of negative expected 
value suits (see I.P.L. Png, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J. Econ. 539 (1983), 
David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 
Int. Rev. Law Econ. 3 (1985), Lucian Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 
437 (1988), Lucian Bebchuk, The Credibility and Success of Suits Known to be Made Soley to Extract a 
Settlement Offer (unpublished manuscript, Nov. 1991) and Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits 
on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 Int. Rev. Law Econ. 3 (1990)).  
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   trial. 
 Va, Vb    =  plaintiffs and defendants estimates of expectedvalue  
   of litigation in a bifurcated trial 
 Va|w, Vb|w = plaintiffs and defendants estimates of expected value  
   of litigation in a bifurcated trial conditional on plaintiff  
   winning liability phase  
 Va(u), Vb(u)   = plaintiffs and defendants estimates of expected value 
   of litigation in a unitary trial  in which liability and damages  
   are tried together 
 Va(u|s), Vb(u|s) = plaintiffs and defendants estimates of expected value  
   of litigation in a unitary trial  in which the parties stipulate to  
  damages    
In order to simplify the analysis, I make a number of assumptions none of which are 
critical to the results. I assume the parties are risk neutral so expected utility equals 
expected wealth or income. I abstract from the question how the parties determine their 
litigation expenditures; and the related question how these expenditures influence the 
likely outcome of the litigation. Instead, I assume that a and b are given and, therefore, 
that pa, pb, Ja and Jb are also given.10 Consistent with the standard litigation model, I 
allow the parties to have different expectations of pa, pb, Ja and Jb. I also assume that k is 
the same for A and B or that the distribution of litigation costs between the liability and 
damage phases of a bifurcated trial is equal for both parties. I also assume that it costs 
nothing to bring a lawsuit or to settle one as opposed to litigating a lawsuit. One could 
easily include in the model a cost of filing a complaint and a cost of settling a lawsuit. 
This would not change the basic results of the paper provided these costs are less than 
the costs of litigating a trial. I assume further that parties know at the outset whether a 
trial will be bifurcated or not.  
Finally, I assume provisionally that there are no diseconomies of scope in 
litigating liability and damages in a bifurcated compared to unitary trial. That is, if it 
cost $10 to litigate liability and $10 to litigate damages in separate phases of a bifurcated 
trial, it cost $20 to litigate them jointly. The absence of diseconomies implies that 
bifurcation lowers the expected cost of litigation compared to a unitary trial in which 
both liability and damages are litigated since the probability that the parties will not 
litigate damages following the liability phase of a bifurcated trial is positive.11 Not 
                                                                                                                                                             
10An alternative assumption is that As expenditures increase the probability of winning and the 
damage award while Bs reduce them but that the effects of these expenditures cancel out so that pa, pb, 
Ja and Jb stay the same. 
11Let E(c) denote the expected cost of litigating a bifurcated trial where E(c) = kc + p(1 - k)c and p 
equals the probability that A wins liability multiplied by the probability that the parties litigate damages 
conditional on A winning liability. Since p < 1 and c equals the cost of litigating a unitary trial, E(c) < c.  
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surprisingly, the conclusions I reach change if there are substantial (but not small) 
diseconomies of scope. I consider diseconomies in Section III of the paper. 
B. The Parties Settle Damages in a Bifurcated Trial 
Let Ja and Jb denote the expected damages that both parties believe a court would 
award A in the damage phase of a bifurcated trial. Consider first whether the parties 
would litigate the damage phase conditional on B being found liable.12 A would prefer 
to settle damages provided B offered A a sum not less than 
 Va|w = Ja - (1 - k)a (1)  
where Va|w denotes As expected damage award conditional on A winning liability 
net of the cost of litigating damages ((1 - k)a). After losing liability, B prefers to settle 
damages provided he pays no more than 
 Vb|w = Jb + (1 - k)b (2) 
where Vb|w is Bs expected losses including litigation costs in the damage phase of a 
bifurcated trial. If Vb|w ≥ Va|w or equivalently if  Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)c, the parties will always 
settle the damage phase of a bifurcated trial (conditional on A winning liability) because 
both parties can be made better off by settling and saving the costs of litigating 
damages.13   
Several points should be noted.  
1. Even if the parties agree on damages (Ja - Jb = 0), I assume the costs of litigating 
damages is still be positive (i.e., (1 - k)c > 0). These costs include court costs, the time and 
effort of the parties, their attorneys and experts in developing and presenting 
information on damages.  
2. Mutual optimism about damages (Ja - Jb > 0) is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to litigate damages in a bifurcated trial. In the example above, the degree of 
mutual optimism is too small to overcome the cost of litigating damages. Therefore, the 
cost of litigating damages will not enter As decision to sue or As and Bs decision to 
settle or litigate the lawsuit.  
3. Since a settlement on damages (conditional on A winning liability) will leave both 
parties at least as well off as if they litigate damages, we can write 
 Js|w = Ja - (1 - k)a + ea = Jb + (1 - k)b - eb (3)  
                                                                                                                                                             
12In analyzing this example and others, it is helpful to work backwards from the damage question. 
That is, I first look at how the parties behave conditional on the plaintiff winning liability, and then ask 
how the parties act at earlier stages of the litigation.  
13This statement is true only if Va|w ≥ 0, otherwise A, by assumption, does not have a credible threat 
to litigate damages if a settlement fails. If Va|w < 0, B will refuse to settle damages conditional on A 
winning liability. Knowing this, A will not bother to sue B in the first place. I assume throughout the 
paper that Va|w ≥ 0 unless otherwise indicated. 
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 where Js|w denotes the conditional settlement, ea (≥ 0) the gain A receives above the 
minimum amount A will accept to settle damages after winning liability, and eb (≥ 0) the 
gain that B receives from settling for less than his maximum offer after losing liability. 
Observe that the combined surplus, ea + eb, equals (1 - k)c - (Ja - Jb) or the joint savings 
from not litigating damages minus the difference between As and Bs estimate of 
damages. How the parties divide this surplus from settling damages is uncertain and 
may depend on the bargaining strategies they employ. 
Now consider As decision to sue B. A will sue if  
 Va = paJs|w - ka ≥ 0. (4)  
Notice that Va makes no allowance for the costs of litigating damages.14 Since A expects 
to settle damages if he wins liability, A will value his claim on the assumption that he 
will not incur the cost of litigating damages ((1 - k)a). 
Assuming A sues, he will settle both liability and damages out of court rather than 
go to trial on the question of liability alone if he is offered a sum at least as great as Va in 
equation (4). Thus, Va also represents the minimum amount A will settle for before trial 
(i.e., As minimum demand). 
Vb equals what B expects to pay A if the case is tried plus Bs litigation costs (limited 
to his cost of litigating liability since B also expects that damages will not be litigated) as 
in 
 Vb = pbJs|w + kb. (5) 
Vb also equals Bs maximum offer to settle before trial because anything lower will 
leave B better off than if he goes to trial.15 
A settlement will be mutually beneficial to both parties and will occur when Vb ≥ Va 
or when 
 kc ≥ (pa - pb)Js|w (6) 
or equivalently 
 kc + (1 - k)(paa + pbb) - (paea + pbeb) ≥ paJa - pbJb. (7) 
                                                                                                                                                             
14I adopt the convention that A will sue if Va is positive or zero. Similarly, I assume that the parties 
will settle a claim if the gain from settling is positive or zero.  
15Observe that equations (4) and (5) assume not only that both parties expect to settle damages but 
that they expect to settle damages for the same amount (= Js|w). The latter need not follow from the 
former because the parties could have different expectations over the likely division of the settlement 
surplus (conditional on A winning liability). The assumption of identical expectations of the settlement 
surplus simplifies the notation but does not change the results of the analysis. For example, the maximum 
disagreement over the surplus would occur in either of two cases: when either A expects to settle for Ja - 
(1 - k)a and B expects to pay Jb + (1 - k)b; or when A expects to settle for Jb + (1 - k)b and B expects to pay 
Ja - (1 - k)a. In the former (maximum settlement pessimism), each party expects the other to receive the 
full surplus from settling damages; in the latter (maximum settlement optimism), each party expects to 
receive the full surplus from settling. Although a settlement on liability is more likely in the former case, 
the conclusions I reach later on the difference between bifurcated and unitary trials remain the same.  
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Alternatively, a trial on liability will result if  
 kc < (pa - pb)Js|w. (8)  
Conditions (6) and (8) repeat the well known result that mutual optimism (pa > pb) is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a trial to occur, and that a trial is more likely 
(given mutual optimism), the smaller the cost of litigation (kc), the greater the degree of 
mutual optimism and the greater the expected damages. Observe that the costs of 
litigation excludes the costs of litigating damages because if B wins liability, the 
litigation ends, and if A wins liability, the litigation also ends because the parties settle 
damages. 
C. The Parties Litigate Damages in a Bifurcated Trial  
Now assume that the parties are sufficiently optimistic about damages  (Ja - Jb > (1 - 
k)c) that they litigate damages if A wins the liability phase of a bifurcated trial. To 
simplify, I assume that the average of As and Bs estimates of damages remains 
constant. Thus, Ja increases and Jb decreases by equal but offsetting amounts which now 
cause the parties to litigate damages if A wins liability. 
Under bifurcation, A will sue if 
 Va = pa(Ja - (1 - k)a) - ka  ≥ 0. (9) 
Assuming A sues and both parties expect to litigate damages conditional on A 
winning liability, Bs expected loss from litigating or his maximum settlement offer 
equals  
 Vb = pb(Jb + (1 - k)b) + kb.  (10) 
Whether the parties settle the entire lawsuit before the liability phase depends on 
whether Vb ≥ Va or   
 kc + (1 - k)(paa + pbb) ≥ paJa - pbJb. (11) 
The key difference between (11) and the example in part B is that the parties always 
avoid the cost of litigating damage in part B whereas here the parties only avoid this 
cost if A loses liability. How this affects As incentives to sue and the trial/settlement 
decision is unclear. Although the cost of litigation rises when the parties expect to 
litigate damages conditional on A winning liability (compare (7) and (11)) the difference 
between paJa - pbJb also increases (because that is the reason the parties expect to litigate 
damages).16 
                                                                                                                                                             
16Until now I have assumed that the parties act as if they know whether they will settle or litigate 
damages (conditional on Bs liability) in a bifurcated trial. If the parties are uncertain, the analysis of 
bifurcation remains essentially the same. Suppose A does not have sufficient information to know 
whether he will litigate or settle damages. Let qa equal As estimate of the probability that Jb ≤ Ja - (1 - k)c  
or, equivalently, the probability that the parties will litigate damages conditional on A winning liability. 
Let (1 - qa) equal As estimate of the probability that they will settle damages. Then, the expected value of 
As claim is a weighted average of the value of As claim when A expects to litigate (eq. (9)) and to settle 
damages (eq. (4)) with the weights equal to qa and (1 - qa) respectively. If at the time of the 
9 
Another question is whether the parties would ever settle or stipulate to Bs liability 
and litigate damages only.17 This question doesnt arise when the parties expect to settle 
damages because then a settlement on liability would end the lawsuit. Clearly, A 
prefers to stipulate to Bs liability because it avoids the prospect of losing liability 
without affecting the value of As claim in the damage phase of a bifurcated trial. B 
might prefer this result as well but only in unusual circumstances. Recall that Vb|w 
denotes Bs expected loss if A wins liability (see eq. (2)). If B litigates both liability and 
damages, Vb is given by equation (10). Hence Vb|w < Vb only if 
 (1 - pb)Vb|w < kb  (12)  
or if Bs expected gain from litigating liability (which equals the probability that he wins 
liability multiplied by the loss he avoids) is less than the cost of litigating liability. 
Inequality (12) is more likely to hold, the greater the cost of litigating liability relative to 
damages (i.e., the greater is k), the greater Bs estimate of the probability that A will win 
liability, and the smaller the damages B expects to pay conditional on A winning 
liability. In these circumstances, B could find it advantageous to accept liability and 
move on to damages. Observe that in a unitary trial, the parties can also agree not to 
contest liability and litigate only damages. Hence, if both parties find it advantageous 
not to contest liability, there is no difference, as a first approximation, between a 
bifurcated and unitary trial because in both there is only a single disputed issue 
(damages).18 
                                                                                                                                                             
trial/settlement decision (assuming A sues) neither party knows whether they will settle damages if A 
wins liability we have 
Va = pa(Ja  -  (1 - k)a)  - ka + pa(1 - qa)ea 
 
Vb = pb(Jb + (1 - k)b) + kb - pb(1 - qb)eb 
                  where ea and eb denote As and Bs estimates of their expected surplus if the 
parties settle damages conditional on A winning liability. The parties will settle if 
            kc + (1 - k)(paa + pbb) - pa(1 - qa)ea - pb(1 - qb)eb ≥ paJa - pbJb       Other things 
constant, settling liability is less likely, the more likely each party believes that damages will be settled 
(conditional on A winning liability) and the greater each partys estimate of the expected settlement 
surplus. If after A sues B, the parties acquire enough information to know whether they will settle or 
litigate damages (conditional on A winning liability), the analysis of whether to settle or litigate liability 
would follow either the example in part B or part C.  
 
17In this context, settling liability cannot mean that A and B agree that B is not liable. If so, there 
would be no litigation on damages. This is equivalent to A deciding not to sue.  
18I say as a first approximation because a defendant is more willing to stipulate to liability in a 
unitary than bifurcated trial. Assuming a unitary trial involves both liability and damages, B will 
stipulate to liability if Jb + (1 - k)b < pbJb + b or if (1 - pb)Jb < kb. Since Jb < Vb|w in (12), B is more willing 
to stipulate to liability in a unitary than bifurcated trial. The reason is that the benefit to B net of litigation 
cost from contesting and winning liability in a unitary trial is smaller than in a bifurcated trial because B 
10 
D. Unitary versus Bifurcated Trial 
When liability and damages are tried together (the unitary trial), one might expect 
that A will sue only if his expected gain from litigation is equal to or greater than his 
cost of litigating both liability and damages. Similarly, one might expect that the parties 
would settle a unitary trial if the cost of litigating both liability and damages is less than 
or equal to paJa - pbJb. This view overlooks the possibility that the parties may find it 
mutually beneficial to stipulate to an amount of damages in a unitary trial and avoid the 
cost of litigating damages.19 Moreover, the same factors (i.e., the cost of litigating 
damages and the difference in their beliefs about damages) which influence their 
decision to settle or litigate damages in a bifurcated trial also influence their willingness 
to stipulate to damages in a unitary trial. 
Let Va(u) equals the expected value of As claim in a unitary trial when the parties 
do not stipulate to damages (or to liability).20 Since litigation costs includes both the cost 
of litigating liability and damages,  
 Va(u) = paJa - a.  (13) 
Let Va(u|s) equal the expected value of As claim when he stipulates to damages of Js|u 
where 
 Va(u|s) = paJs|u - ka. (14)  
Observe that cost of litigation is lower in (14) than (13). A is willing to stipulate to 
damages in a unitary trial provided Va(u|s) ≥ Va(u) or, equivalently, where Js|u ≥ Ja - (1 - 
k)a/pa. Similarly, the expected value of Bs liability in a unitary trial is either 
 Vb(u) = pbJb + b (15)  
or 
 Vb(u|s) = pbJs|u + kb (16)  
depending on whether the parties stipulate to damages. B is willing to stipulate to 
damages if Vb(u|s) ≤ Vb(u) or where Js|u ≤ Jb + (1 - k)b/pb. Therefore, it will be mutually 
beneficial to stipulate to damages in a unitary trial if Jb + (1 - k)b/pb ≥ Ja - (1 - k)a/pa or if 
 Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)(a/pa + b/pb). (17) 
 If (17) holds, both A and B can be made better off by stipulating to damages in a unitary 
trial.  
                                                                                                                                                             
incurs the cost of litigating damages in the former but not the latter. This assumes that each party pays his 
own litigation costs (i.e., the American rule).  
19If the parties are unable to stipulate to damages in a unitary trial, then a unitary trial will always 
cost more than a bifurcated trial assuming bifurcation does not cause significant diseconomies in 
litigation. 
20I assume that the parties estimates of the probability of A prevailing on liability and the amount of 
damages do not depend on whether liability and damages are tried together or separately. Some evidence 
suggests that the probability of the plaintiff prevailing may be greater when liability and damages are 
litigated together. 
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Recall the parties will settle damages in a bifurcated trial when Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)(a + b). 
Since both pa and pb are less than one, it follows that the parties are more likely to 
stipulate to damages in a unitary trial than to settle damages in a bifurcated trial (conditional on 
A winning liability). Put differently, the degree of mutual optimism with respect to 
damages must be greater in a unitary than bifurcated trial for the parties to litigate 
rather than settle damages. This result can be given an intuitive explanation. In a 
bifurcated trial, the parties only incur the costs of litigating damages if the defendant is 
liable. Thus, the parties discount these costs by the probability that the plaintiff wins 
liability. In contrast, there is no discounting in a unitary trial because the parties incur 
these costs before they know whether the defendant is liable. This leads to greater 
expected savings in costs from not litigating damages in a unitary trial.21  
Figure 1 illustrates this point. Suppose we have a large number of lawsuits which 
differ only in the estimates of Ja - Jb (but not in the average of the parties estimates of 
damages). Since the area to the left of (1-k)(a + b) is smaller than the area to the left of (1 
- k)(a/pa + b/pb) in Figure 1, a larger fraction of litigants will be willing to stipulate to 
damages in a unitary than bifurcated trial, other things the same. 
 (1-k)(a+b) (1 - k)(a/p  + b/ p  )a b
  II  III
J  - Ja b
frequency
  I
Figure 1
 
In comparing unitary and bifurcated trials, I consider disputes in each of the three 
categories shown in Figure 1.  
                                                                                                                                                             
21There are additional complications, however. Although putting off litigation expenditures on 
damages in a bifurcated trial reduces the incentive to agree to damages, there is a factor working in the 
other direction. The parties may have an incentive to increase there expenditures on litigating damages in 
a bifurcated trial once liability is established because such expenditures have a greater payoff (i.e., they 
are not discounted by the probability of winning liability). I discuss this point later although, as noted 
earlier, I have not explicitly modeled litigation expenditures in this paper. Another qualification is that in 
some cases the parties may avoid expenditures on litigating damages even in a unitary trial. For example, 
the court may direct a verdict in favor of the defendant before either party has put on any evidence on 
damages. I ignore this possibility and assume instead that a decision in a unitary trial is reached after 
both parties have completed their case.  
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Category I: the difference between Ja - Jb is less than both (1 - k)(a + b) and (1 - k)(a/pa 
+ b/pb) so that the parties agree on damages in both a unitary and bifurcated trial. 
Category II: the difference between Ja - Jb is greater than (1 - k)(a + b) but less than (1 - 
k)(a/pa + b/pb) so that the parties expect to litigate damages in a bifurcated trial 
(conditional on the plaintiff winning liability) but stipulate to damages in a unitary trial. 
Category III: the difference between Ja - Jb is greater than both (1 - k)(a + b) and (1 - 
k)(a/pa + b/pb) so that the parties expect to litigate damages in both a bifurcated 
(conditional on the plaintiff winning liability) and unitary trial. 
In Category I there is no systematic difference between a bifurcated and unitary trial. 
In both, the expected value of the lawsuit to A is paJi - ka (where the subscript i 
denotes either Js|u, the expected stipulation on damages in a unitary trial, or Js|w,the 
expected settlement on damages conditional on A winning liability in a bifurcated trial). 
Since there is no reason to believe that Js|u and Js|w will systematically differ, Va will 
equal Va(u|s) on average and, therefore, the incentive for A to sue will be the same in a 
bifurcated and unitary trial.22 Since Vb will equal Vb(u|s) on average, the probability 
that defendants maximum offer will be greater than or equal to the plaintiffs minimum 
demand will be the same in a bifurcated and unitary trial. Therefore, the likelihood that 
the parties will settle their lawsuit will also be the same. Finally, for lawsuits in Category 
I that go to trial, the costs of a bifurcated and unitary trial will be the same because only 
liability will be litigated in both. 
Category III provides the most striking differences between a bifurcated and unitary 
trial. (I consider Category II later but note here that the effects on As incentive to sue 
and the trial/settlement decision are ambiguous in Category II .) Recall that Category III 
occurs when the difference between As and Bs estimate of damages is sufficiently large 
that the parties will neither stipulate to damages in a unitary trial nor settle damages 
(conditional on A winning liability) in a bifurcated trial. In Category III the expected 
values of As claim in a bifurcated and unitary trial are given by (9) and (13) 
respectively. Therefore, the added incentive to sue under bifurcation equals 
Va - Va(u) = (1 - pa)(1 - k)a > 0. (18)  
Bifurcation increases the expected value of As claim by the savings in the cost of 
litigating damages weighted by the probability that A loses liability.23  
                                                                                                                                                             
22Although the range for stipulating or settling damages will be greater in the case of a unitary than 
bifurcated trial (between Jb + (1 - k)b/pb and Ja - (1 - k)a/pa in the unitary trial and Jb + (1 - k)b and Ja - (1 - 
k)a in the bifurcated trial), there is no reason to expect the averages to differ. The cost of reaching a 
stipulation on damages may be different than the cost of settling damages in a bifurcated trial but I have 
excluded these considerations from the analysis. 
23If A wins liability, the parties will litigate damages and thus there will be no savings from 
bifurcation. Hence, savings occur only if A loses liability. 
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Recall that the parties will settle both liability and damages in a bifurcated trial if kc 
+ (1 - k)(paa + pbb) ≥ paJa - pbJb (see (11)). In a unitary trial the parties will settle if c ≥ 
paJa - pbJb. Since bifurcation decreases the expected cost of litigation (i.e., kc + (1 - k)(paa 
+ pbb) < c), the incentive to settle will be smaller for a bifurcated than unitary trial.24 It 
also follows that the incremental incentive to litigate under bifurcation, other things the 
same, will be greater the greater the fraction of litigation cost saved (i.e., the greater is (1 
- k)) if the plaintiff loses liability, and the greater the probability that the plaintiff loses 
(the smaller are pa and pb). 
Another way to see why bifurcation increases the incentive to litigate is that the 
prospect of a bifurcated trial not only increases the expected value of As claim but 
simultaneously reduces Bs expected liability. That is  
Vb - Vb(u) = - (1 - pb)(1 - k)b  < 0 (19)  
where Bs gain (i.e., a lower expected loss) from bifurcation is his savings from not 
litigating damages if A loses liability. Thus, bifurcation lowers Bs maximum settlement 
offer at the same time it increases As minimum acceptance. This narrowing of the 
settlement range lowers the likelihood that the parties will find settlement mutually 
beneficial in a bifurcated compared to a unitary trial. 
In short, we have established the following three propositions in the special case 
where the disagreement on damages is sufficiently large relative to the cost of litigating 
damages that the parties will neither stipulate nor settle damages. 
1. The expected cost of a bifurcated trial will be less than a unitary trial because bifurcation 
eliminates the costs of litigating damages if the plaintiff loses liability. 
2. The incentive to sue will be greater for a bifurcated trial than a unitary trial. 
3. The incentive to litigate rather than settle will be greater for a bifurcated trial than a 
unitary trial. 
We can add a fourth proposition concerning the likely range of pretrial settlements 
assuming that the parties agree on damages and that the type of trial does not affect 
each partys expectation of the likelihood of prevailing on liability. 
4. The range of settlement payments before trial will be smaller under bifurcation. With 
bifurcation, a settlement will range between  paJ a- ka - pa(1 - k)a and pbJ b+ kb + pb(1 - k)b. In a 
unitary trial, a settlement will range between paJ a- a and pbJ b+ b. 
Points 2 and 3 above imply that bifurcation may increase the total cost of litigation 
for disputes in Category III, notwithstanding the cost saving (point 1) that results from 
the possibility of avoiding the cost of litigating damages. Total litigation cost will 
increase if the added cost resulting from both the increase in the number of plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                                                             
24A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a trial in both the bifurcated and non-bifurcated 
examples is that the paJa - pbJb > 0. It is possible that even if the parties were mutually pessimistic over 
liability (pa < pb), mutual optimism over damages could be large enough to satisfy the necessary 
condition for a trial. 
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who sue and the increase in the proportion of suits that are litigated rather than settled 
is greater than the cost savings from eliminating litigation over damages.25  
I note a fifth proposition. 
5. Bifurcation benefits all plaintiffs in disputes covered by Category III but harms some 
defendants and benefits others. All plaintiffs benefit because bifurcation increases the expected 
value of their lawsuits. This, in turn, implies that some defendants in bifurcated trials would not 
have been sued in unitary trials (i.e., where Va(u) < 0 but Va ≥ 0). Clearly, bifurcation makes 
these defendants worse off. On the other hand, bifurcation makes all other defendants (those who 
would have been sued anyway) better off because it lowers their expected losses.  
Finally, I turn to disputes in Category II. There, (1 - k)(a + b) <  Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)(a/pa + 
b/pb) so that the parties litigate damages in a bifurcated trial but stipulate to damages in 
a unitary trial. Observe that whether bifurcation increases or decreases As incentive to 
sue in Category II is uncertain. This depends on whether Va = pa(Ja - (1 - k)a) - ka is 
greater or less than Va(u|s) = paJs|u - ka. Since Js|u can be as low as As minimum 
demand (Ja - (1 - k)a/pa), this implies that Va > Va(u|s) for values of Js|u between Ja - (1 - 
k)a/pa and Ja - (1 - k)a. Alternatively, if Js|u equals Bs maximum offer, Va(u|s) may be 
greater or less than Va.26 Next consider the decision to settle or litigate a lawsuit in 
Category II. Not surprisingly, one cannot say whether bifurcation increases or decreases 
the incentive to settle. Just as one cannot not show whether Va(u|s) is greater or less 
than Va, one cannot show whether Vb(u|s) is greater or less than Vb. Hence, it is unclear 
whether bifurcation narrows or increases the settlement range for disputes in Category II  
Category II , however, probably accounts for only a small fraction of disputes. It is 
limited to disputes in which Ja - Jb is larger than (1 - k)(a + c) but smaller than (1 - k)(a/pa 
+ b/pb). Thus, it excludes both large and small differences in damages (areas I and III in 
Figure 1). More importantly, Category II is likely to account for even fewer disputes than 
shown in Figure 1, if one considers the likely effects of bifurcation on litigation 
expenditures. Both A and B have an incentive to spend more on litigating damages in a 
bifurcated than unitary trial because the returns from such expenditures are larger. In a 
unitary trial, the return is discounted by the probability that the party expects to prevail 
                                                                                                                                                             
25I make no judgment whether an increase in litigation is good or bad. For example, the 
observation that bifurcation increases the number of plaintiffs who sue could be deemed beneficial 
because it leads to greater deterrence of behavior giving rise to the plaintiffs injury. Alternatively, one 
might argue that it leads to more suits involving less meritorious claims and, therefore, is socially 
harmful. 
26Va(u|s) will be greater than Va if (1-k)(a + b/pb) > Ja - Jb, which is more likely the smaller is pb. 
(Since (1 - k)(a + b) < Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)(a/pa + b/pb) in Category II, the closer pb is to one, the more likely that 
Va(u|s) < Va.) Intuitively, the smaller is pb, the greater the expected savings to B from stipulating to 
damages (because B believes it less likely that he will have to pay any damages) and, therefore, the 
greater the amount that B is willing to stipulate to before litigating a unitary trial. 
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on liability which should lead to lower expenditures. In contrast, no discounting takes 
place in a bifurcated trial since the parties incur these expenditures only if the plaintiff 
prevails on liability. This factor shifts to the right the point labelled (1 - k)(a + b) in 
Figure 1 and narrows area II.27 A related point is that the defendant in a unitary trial 
may be unwilling to put on strong evidence on the plaintiffs alleged injury for fear that 
the jury will construe it as an admission of liability. This factor lowers the defendants 
expenditures on litigating damages in a unitary trial, and makes it less likely that the 
parties will stipulate to damages. Finally, there may be large bargaining cost in a 
unitary trial which prevents the parties from stipulating to damages notwithstanding 
that it appears mutually beneficial to do so. Note that the reason for the greater 
settlement range on damages in a unitary trial is that the cost of litigating damages is 
divided by the parties estimates of the probabilities that the plaintiff prevails on 
liability. Pretrial discussions on damages, therefore, may reveal information on the 
relevant liability probabilities, which in turn lead to strategic considerations that raise 
bargaining cost. A related point is that a defendant in a unitary trial may reject a 
stipulation on damages because he believes it will be viewed as a tacit admission of 
liability. If a stipulation on damages in a unitary trial is ruled out, bifurcation always 
lowers the expected cost of litigation relative to a unitary trial because damages will not 
be litigated if either the plaintiff loses liability or if the parties settle damages 
conditional on the plaintiff winning liability. 
E. Social Welfare and Bifurcation. 
The formal analysis cannot answer the question whether bifurcation increases or 
decreases social welfare. First, one does not know the possible social benefit or harm 
from additional litigation caused by bifurcation in Category III type disputes.28 Second, 
the model abstracts from such considerations as the costs of settling out of court, 
possible diseconomies of scope from bifurcation and the relationship between litigation 
expenditures and outcomes. Without such information one cannot determine how 
bifurcation affects social welfare. Still, the model point outs various ways bifurcation 
affects the behavior of potential litigants, and the likely impact this has on the aggregate 
cost of litigation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
27That is, Category II requires (1 - k)(a + b) < Ja - Jb ≤ (1 - k)(a/pa + b/pb). Figure 1 is drawn on the 
assumption that  = 1 but the discussion in the text suggests that > 1 which reduces area II. 
28For Categories I and II, we showed that there are no systematic differences in the incentive to litigate 
versus settle between unitary and bifurcated trials. In Category I the parties either stipulate to damages or 
expect to settle damages conditional on the plaintiff winning liability. Hence, the cost of litigation is 
limited to the cost of litigating liability which, as a first approximation, is the same in a bifurcated and 
unitary trial. For Category II disputes the cost of litigating a unitary trial is lower than a bifurcated trial but 
the difference in the parties beliefs about expected damages is also likely to be lower. Hence there is no 
reason to expect the rate of litigation in Category II to differ systematically between unitary and bifurcated 
trials 
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Bifurcation lowers the expected cost of litigation per litigated case for disputes in 
Category III. Expected costs fall because the parties save the cost of litigating damages if 
the defendant is found not liable. Summing these expected cost savings per case over a 
large number of litigated cases may yield substantial savings, in part, because 
defendants are likely to win a significant fraction of litigated cases.29 To be sure, these 
cost savings will be offset somewhat by the cost savings from unitary trials in Category II 
disputes but the number of such disputes is likely to be far lower than those in Category 
III.30 In general, the total cost savings from bifurcation and hence the gain in social 
welfare will be greater, other things constant, the greater the number of lawsuits in 
Category III relative to Category II, the greater the cost of litigating damages, and the 
greater the fraction of defendants who win liability. 
Other things, however, are not constant. In particular, bifurcation produces two 
effects that tend to raise the number of litigated disputes and thus increase the 
aggregate cost of litigation. First, bifurcation raises the expected value of each potential 
plaintiffs expected claim in Category III. This factor increases the number of plaintiffs 
who sue because some potential plaintiffs who would have chosen not to sue when 
faced with the prospect of a unitary trial now find their expected damage award greater 
than the expected cost of suing under bifurcation. The number of additional suits 
depends positively both on the expected cost savings per plaintiff and the number of 
plaintiffs who are close enough to the critical value for suing that switching from a 
unitary to bifurcated trial would cause them to sue.  
Second, bifurcation reduces the fraction of litigants in Category III who settle their 
entire claim out of court. Since bifurcation increases the value of the plaintiffs claim by 
lowering expected litigation costs, it raises the plaintiffs minimum demand to settle 
liability. Less obviously, bifurcation lowers the defendants maximum offer to settle 
because it lowers his expected cost of litigation by saving the cost of litigating damages 
if he wins liability. Bifurcation narrows the possible settlement range and, thereby, 
increases the likelihood of litigation. The effect of bifurcation on the fraction of cases 
that are litigated will be greater, the greater the expected cost savings from bifurcation 
                                                                                                                                                             
29George Priests important studies of dispute resolution (see G. Priest and B. Klein,  The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1984), G. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis, 14 J. 
Leg. Stud. 215 (1985) and G. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. Law Econ. Org. 193 (1987)) suggest that 
defendants win about 50 percent of the cases that go to trial. Other studies suggest that the defendants 
are successful in more than 50 percent of litigated cases in particular areas of law. (See J. Perloff and D. 
Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation, in Private Antitrust Litigation. Eds. S. Salop and L. 
White, MIT Press (1987) and D. Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. Leg. Stud. 185 
(1985) and Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the 
Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. Leg. Stud. 313 (1988)). 
30In Category II, the parties stipulate to damages in a unitary trial but expect to litigate damages in a 
bifurcated trial. Thus, the cost of litigation is k(a + b) in the former but k(a + b) + (1 - k)(paa + pbb) in the 
latter. 
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and the greater the fraction of cases that are close enough to the litigation threshold that 
bifurcation causes a switch from settlement to litigation.  
In short, the net effect of bifurcation on the aggregate cost of litigation is unclear. 
Although bifurcation results in expected costs savings per litigated case in Category III, it 
increases the number of plaintiffs who sue and the fraction of cases that go to trial. 
Moreover, the greater the expected cost savings per case, the greater the importance of 
these offsetting factors. Two factors suggest that any benefits from additional lawsuits 
in Category III are likely to be small or even negative. Bifurcation is most likely to 
increase the amount of litigation (1)by increasing the number of cases brought by 
plaintiffs with the least meritorious claims defined as cases where the probability of the 
plaintiff winning is relatively low; and (2)by increasing the rate of litigation among 
cases where the disagreement among parties is relatively small. Litigating rather than 
settling the latter cases should create smaller precedential benefits than litigating cases 
where the absence of clear precedents cause widely divergent expectations on trial 
outcomes. 
II. Extensions of the Model 
I limit the analysis in Section II to disputes in Category III for several reasons. First, 
the principal difference between a bifurcated and unitary trial occurs for disputes in 
which each party is sufficiently optimistic about damages that bifurcation holds out the 
prospect of avoiding litigation on damages if the plaintiff loses liability. Second, 
damages are never litigated in Category I so that a bifurcated and unitary trial are 
effectively the same. Third, although the expected cost of a unitary trial is less than a 
bifurcated trial in Category II, this leads to no systematic differences in the number of 
lawsuits and the settlement rate. Fourth, if the parties are unable to agree on damages 
prior to trial notwithstanding that it would be mutually beneficial to do so, Category III 
represents the relevant comparison between a unitary and bifurcated trial. Finally, it 
would be tedious to consider each of the three categories in the analysis below.  
A. Diseconomies of Bifurcation 
Until now I have assumed that the cost of litigation is the same whether liability and 
damages are tried together or separately.31 A bifurcated trial might cost more because it 
requires repetition of evidence, additional time to select a different jury to hear damages 
and greater travel time of witnesses who testify on both liability and damages.32  
                                                                                                                                                             
31I briefly discussed the incentive to spend more on litigating damages in a bifurcated than unitary 
trial because the expected return is greater in the former than in the latter. Here, I focus on potential 
diseconomies from bifurcation which means that the cost of presenting identical evidence is greater in a 
bifurcated than unitary trial. 
32In the only systematic empirical investigation of bifurcated trials, Zeisel and Callahan (see Split 
Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1606 (1967)) find conflicting evidence on 
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To be sure, one may be able to minimize these diseconomies by litigating damages 
before the same judge and jury immediately after the defendant is found liable.33 This 
practice, however, would reduce the likelihood that the parties will settle the damage 
part of a bifurcated trial because it raises k relative to (1 - k).34 Without delay between 
the liability and damage phases, the parties will have to be ready to litigate damages 
even if the defendant is found not liable. Thus, some costs associated with litigating 
damages will be incurred before or during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial. Delay 
allows the parties to wait and see if the defendant is liable before incurring these costs. 
This points out an important distinction between diseconomies and expected cost 
savings from bifurcation. The former refers to the extra costs, if any, from trying liability 
and damages separately rather than jointly; the latter to the savings from avoiding the 
cost of litigating damages multiplied by the probability they will be avoided. A 
bifurcated trial that litigates the question of damages immediately after finding the 
defendant liable tends to reduce or eliminate any diseconomies. At the same time, it 
reduces the expected cost savings from bifurcation because the parties must incur many 
of the costs associated with litigating damages before concluding the liability phase of a 
bifurcated trial. 
Not surprisingly, large diseconomies can change the conclusions of part I. For 
example, I noted earlier that bifurcation always lowers the cost of litigating a given case 
in Category III compared to a unitary trial. If diseconomies are sufficiently large, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
diseconomies of bifurcation. On the one hand,  they found in bifurcated trials that juries that deliberated 
on liability and damages took on average 6.1 hours (2.7 hours on liability and 3.4 hours on damages) or 
5.6 hours (2.2 hours instead of 2.7 hours on liability when the defendant was found liable and, therefore, 
the same jury deliberated twice) compared to 3.7 hours for unitary trials (see Table 7 at 1621). This 
comparison overstates potential diseconomies. Since defendants win liability in a significant fraction of 
unitary trials  (a verdict for the defendant was found in 44 percent of cases decided after a full trial), there 
may be no deliberation on damages. If we assume the jury spends no time on damages in cases the 
defendant wins and it takes 2.7 hours on average to litigate liability (the average for bifurcated trials), 
then a unitary trial on both liability and damages would take 4.5 hours compared to either 6.1 or 5.6 for a 
bilateral trial. On the hand, Zeisel and Callahan found that it took on average 4.0 trial days for bifurcated 
trials that litigated both liability and damages compared to 4.7 trial days for unitary trials, suggesting 
economies not diseconomies from bifurcation. Zeisel and Callahan recognize potential selection problems 
in the latter figures and, therefore, do not conclude that bifurcated trails on both liability and damages 
take less time than unitary trials.  
33Steven Schulhofer has pointed out to me that the main purpose of bifurcation in criminal trials is to 
prevent prejudice by preventing one decision maker from hearing evidence that is probative to the other 
decision maker. The classic example is where the jury decides guilt and the judge decides the sentence (in 
which evidence on past crimes is relevant but may be deemed prejudicial to the jury). Bifurcation may 
also involve different juries in criminal trials. In this case, there is a trade off between diseconomies 
(because of delay and repetition of evidence) and the benefits from eliminating prejudice. 
34Recall that the parties will settle damages (conditional on the defendants liability) if (1 - k)c ≥ Ja - 
Jb. And if k increases, (1 - k)c decreases which increases the likelihood of litigation on damages.  
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conclusion will no longer hold. To see this, let p equal the probability the parties litigate 
damages in a bifurcated trial (i.e., p equals the probability that A wins liability ) and  
equal an index of diseconomies. When  > 1, bifurcation results in cost diseconomies; the 
greater , the greater are the diseconomies. Let E(c) equal the expected cost of litigating 
both liability and damages in a bifurcated trial where E(c) = kc + p(1 - k)c. Since c 
equals the cost of litigating a unitary trial, bifurcation will reduce cost only if p < 1. 
One can solve for the optimal amount of delay between liability and damages as 
follows. Let t = the time delay between a trial on liability and damages and assume that 
 = (t) and k = k(t) where  > 0 and k < 0 (i.e., diseconomies increase with t but the 
cost of litigating liability decreases with t as expenditures on litigating damages can be 
deferred until after the liability trial). Assuming the parties will litigate damages if A 
wins liability, the expected cost of litigation under bifurcation will equal 
 E(C) = p(t)(1 - k(t))c + k(t)c (20) 
where p equals the probability that A will prevail on liability. Minimizing (20) with 
respect to t yields either (1) t* = 0 if p(1 - k(t)) + k(1 - p(t)) > 0 for all values of t > 0; 
or (2) t* > 0 where t* satisfies p(1 - k(t)) = - k(1 - p(t)). Optimal delay is zero if any 
delay adds more to expected diseconomies than it adds to the cost of litigating liability. 
Assuming some delay is optimal (and assuming the second-order conditions hold), t 
will increase until the expected marginal diseconomies equals the marginal increase in 
litigating liability. Notice that t* = 0 if p(t) > 1. It follows that the greater is p, the 
shorter the delay. Intuitively, since a greater p increases the likelihood that damages 
will be litigated, it also will increase the benefit from eliminating diseconomies due to 
delay. 
How do diseconomies affect our analysis? First, consider whether A will sue. As 
noted, I assume that the disagreement on damages is sufficiently large so that the 
parties neither stipulate nor settle damages. Noting that Va = pa(Ja - (1 - k)a) - ka, 
bifurcation will increase the value of As claim compared to a unitary trial if pa1 for 
then Va - Va(u) = (1 - k)a(1 - pa) > 0 The latter is more likely, the smaller the 
diseconomies and the smaller pa.35  
                                                                                                                                                             
35A very crude calculation indicates that diseconomies would not be sufficient to change our prior 
findings. Suppose we assume that diseconomies are proportional to the amount of time a jury takes to 
deliberate both liability and damages in a bifurcated relative to a unitary trial. Using the data provided by 
Zeisel and Callahan (see supra note 32) we have  = 1.48 ( = 3.4/(4.5 - 2.2)). Provided pa < .68, Va will be 
greater than Va(u). Zeisel and Callahan find that plaintiffs win 38 percent of bifurcated trials (.34/.90 in 
Table 6) that are not settled before a verdict on liability. On the other hand, Zeisel and Callahan  find that 
plaintiffs win 55 percent of unitary trials (.42/.76 in Table 6). This suggest that defendants do better in 
bifurcated than unitary trials. If so, then the combination of both diseconomies and different outcomes 
could lead to the conclusion that the expected value of a plaintiffs claim is greater (not less) under a 
unitary than bifurcated trial. Thus, there would be fewer lawsuits filed under unitary than bifurcated 
trials. I look at the effects of different outcomes in a separate section. 
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Next consider whether the parties will litigate or settle their case. Again, if 
diseconomies are modest relative to the probability of A winning liability (i.e., if 
p, bifurcation will raise As minimum settlement demand, lower Bs maximum 
offer compared to a unitary trial and, therefore, reduce the likelihood of an out of court 
settlement. In short, our prior conclusions remain unchanged unless diseconomies and 
the probability of A winning liability are large (i.e., unless p > 1). 
So far I have considered only the possibility that bifurcation creates cost 
diseconomies. Bifurcation, however, may create economies. Imagine that A claims that 
B has infringed its patent. B counterclaims that A has stolen its trade secret which is the 
basis of As patent. Assume for convenience that both claims cannot be valid (or 
invalid). Either the court upholds As patent or finds that Bs trade secret was stolen. 
Here there are two different damage claims: one for infringing As patent and the other 
for stealing Bs trade secret. In a unitary trial the parties will incur the cost of litigating 
both damage claims. By contrast, in a bifurcated trial the parties will litigate only the 
damage claim that remains after the court decides liability (provided the parties do not 
settle damages). In this example, there will be net economies (not diseconomies) from 
bifurcation if the savings from avoiding the cost of litigating one type of damages is 
greater than the added costs, if any, associated with the extra time and inconvenience of 
bifurcation.36 In short, economies from bifurcation can arise whenever a defendant files 
a counterclaim for damages.37 
                                                                                                                                                             
36For example, suppose in the absence of Bs counterclaim it cost $20  and $10 to litigate liability and 
damages respectively in a bifurcated trial but $28 to litigate both issues jointly. Bifurcation would create 
diseconomies of $2. Now suppose that B counterclaims. The counterclaim increases the cost of litigation. 
Let a unitary trial cost $40$22 on liability and $18 on damages. A bifurcated trial, however, will cost 
$32$22 on liability and, as before, $10 on damages. Hence, economies from bifurcation equal $8. I add 
that one cost saving feature of bifurcation is missing in this example. If the parties do not settle damages 
after the liability phase, they will litigate either As or Bs damage claim. If there was no counterclaim and 
B was found not liable, there would be no litigation on damages. 
37To my knowledge the effect of counterclaims on litigation has not been modelled. Although it is 
tangential to this paper, it is useful to set out briefly the analysis of counterclaims, in part, because the 
results are not obvious. Consider first the unitary trial and assume that there is no stipulation on 
damages. Let Ka and Kb equal As and Bs estimate of Bs damages, a1 and b1 equal As and Bs cost of 
litigating As claim, and a2 and b2 their costs of litigating Bs counterclaim. I assume Ja > Ka and Jb > Kb. 
We can write the expected values of As and Bs claims as follows: 
 Va(u) = paJa - (1 - pa)Ka - a1 - a2  
 Vb(u) = pbJb - (1-pb)Kb + b1 + b2. 
Obviously, the possibility of a counterclaim reduces As incentive to sue since it lowers Va(u) by the 
expected value of the counterclaim and the added cost of litigation. (To simplify I assume that B will not 
independently sue A unless A sues B  i.e., Vb(u) > 0.) If A decides to sue, the parties will settle if  
 c1 + c2  ≥  pa(Ja + Ka) - pb(Jb + Kb) + (Kb - Ka) 
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B. Bifurcation Lowers the Probability that Plaintiff Prevails 
A widely held view is that plaintiffs are less successful in bifurcated than unitary 
trials.38 In part, this rests on the belief that a jury is more likely to sympathize with and 
therefore favor a plaintiff when it also hears evidence on damages.39 A related argument 
is made for tort cases in which the defendant is negligent, the plaintiff contributorily so, 
and contributory negligence bars any recovery. In a unitary trial, a jury may still find 
for the plaintiff but discount the award to reflect his contributory negligence. In effect, 
the jury substitutes comparative negligence for negligence.40 In contrast, a jury deciding 
liability but not damages has less leeway to behave in this manner, particularly if a 
different jury decides damages.41 
                                                                                                                                                             
where c1 = a1 + b1 and c2 = a2 + b2. Mutual optimism is still a necessary condition for litigation. 
Interestingly, a counterclaim is equivalent to an increase in the stakes of litigation (unless Kb - Ka < 0 and 
is sufficiently large to offset the addition of the counterclaim to expected damages). Hence, given mutual 
optimism, the presence of a counterclaim will reduce the likelihood of an out of court settlement 
provided the the cost of litigating the counterclaim (= c2) is less than paKa - pbKb + (Kb - Ka). Note that if 
a settlement occurs, B pays A because I have assumed that Va(u) is ≥ 0 and Vb(u) > 0 .Using the same 
assumptions, the results for a bifurcated trial are as follows. Although the expected value of As claim 
falls, it is still greater than its value in a unitary trial since Va - Va(u) =  (1 -k)[(1 - pa)a1 + paa2]. If A 
decides to sue the parties will settle if 
k(c1 + c2) + (1 - k)[(paa1 + (1 - pa)a2) + (pbb1 + (1 - pb)b2) ] ≥ pa(Ja + Ka) - pb(Jb + Kb) + (Kb - Ka) 
Hence a bifurcated trial reduces the likelihood that parties will settle compared to a unitary trial. 
A more general way to look at counterclaims allows for four possible outcomes: both parties can lose; 
both can win (i.e., As damages are offset by K); and the two outcomes described above. One can show 
that differences between a bifurcated and unitary trial continue to hold for this more general model of 
counterclaims. 
38Zeisel and Callahan, supra note 30, find in their sample of cases that plaintiffs win 42 percent of 
bifurcated trials compared to 55 percent of unitary trials. Some experimental evidence also suggest this to 
be the case. (See Irwin A. Horowitz and Kenneth Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural 
Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 Law and Human Behavior 269 (1990).)  Several short papers also claim 
that juries are more likely to favor defendants in bifurcated trials. (See Doyle W. Curry and Rosemary T. 
Snider, Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid ThemHow to Win Them, TRIAL 47 (March 1988) and Rx for 
the Defense: Bifurcation of Trial to Prevent Prejudice, FOR THE DEFENSE 2 (April 1984).) 
39Indeed, one of the reasons Rule 42b of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives for bifurcating 
liability and damages is to avoid prejudice. Here, it would be to avoid prejudice to the defendant who has 
to overcome jury bias in favor of a plaintiff who is able to present evidence on his damages.  
40See Wittman, The Price of Negligence Under Differing Liability Rules, 29 J.Law & Econ.151 (1986). 
Wittman found that juries substituted comparative negligence for negligence (the governing liability 
standard) in 1974 and 1975 in California in deciding rear end automobile accidents. 
41There is another possible outcome, however. The jury deciding liability in a bifurcated trial may be 
more likely to reject the defense of contributory negligence because it knows that otherwise the plaintiff 
will receive nothing. Then a different jury deciding damages may award full damages. Hence the net 
effect of bifurcation could be favorable to plaintiffs. 
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Assume these arguments are true and let the probability the plaintiff wins be greater 
in a unitary than bifurcated trial (i.e., pa < pa(u) where pa and pa(u) denote As estimate 
of winning liability in a bifurcated and unitary trial respectively) but let damages 
remain the same.42 First consider As decision to sue. We have Va - Va(u) = (pa - pa(u))Ja + 
(1 - k)a. Thus, a potential plaintiff will be more likely to sue in a bifurcated than unitary 
trial, the greater the cost savings from not litigating damages, the smaller the difference 
in probabilities of winning and the lower damages.43 Obviously if the difference 
between pa(u) and pa offsets the cost savings of bifurcation, Va(u) will be greater than Va 
and bifurcation will reduce the number of lawsuits. 
The decision whether to litigate or settle out of court is unaffected by the assumption 
that pa(u) > pa. Assuming also that pb(u) > pb, bifurcation lowers both the plaintiffs 
minimum demand and the defendants maximum offer. As a first approximation, 
therefore, the decision to litigate or settle is unaffected. Since bifurcation still lowers the 
expected cost of litigation, it reduces the incentive to settle and should lead to a greater 
frequency of trials than a system of unitary trials.  
C. Reverse Bifurcation 
Although reverse bifurcation (litigating damages before liability) may seem bizarre, 
a closer look reveals that in some circumstances it will save more than litigating liability 
first. Such a result might appear counter intuitive because liability is a dispositive issue 
whereas damages is not. If A loses liability, the suit ends and the parties save the cost of 
litigating damages; if damages are decided first, the parties must still resolve liability. 
Litigating damages, however, may also be dispositive because once damages are 
known, A may choose to drop his lawsuit or settle rather than litigate liability. 
Under reverse bifurcation A will estimate the expected value of his claim as follows. 
Consider first how A would proceed after damages are decided. I assume provisionally 
that the parties are mutually optimistic about liability (pa > pb) and, therefore, that a 
trial on liability is possible. To simplify, assume that A believes that damages can take 
one of three values: 
J0: where paJ0 - ka < 0 or J0 < ka/pa. That is, paJ0 is so low that A will be 
 unwilling to incur the cost of litigating liability.  
J1: where (paJ1 - ka) ≥ 0  but pbJ1 + kb ≥ paJ1 - ka, or J1 ≤ kc/(pa - pb). A maintains 
 his claim against B but expects to settle liability. 
J2: where (paJ2 - ka) ≥ 0 but pbJ2 + kb < paJ2 - ka, or J2 > kc/(pa - pb). A maintains his 
 claim but expects to litigate liability 
                                                                                                                                                             
42This assumption differs from the example in the text where the damages are also affected by the 
type of trial. That is, the plaintiff was more likely to win a unitary trial but the damages were lower in 
those circumstances in which the plaintiff would have lost if the trial had been bifurcated. 
43The lower is damages the less likely the plaintiff will sue in both a bifurcated and unitary trial. The 
effect of lower damages, however, is greater in a unitary trial assuming pa(u) > pa. 
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Let ra0, ra1 and ra2 denote the probabilities that J will equal J0, J1 and J2 respectively in 
the damage (and first) phase of a bifurcated trial, and let Js denotes As expected 
settlement on damages after litigating damages.44  
A will sue B if  
 Va = ra1Js + ra2(paJ2 - ka) - (1 - k)a ≥ 0 (21)  
or if the expected value of As claim prior to litigating damages is ≥ 0. Observe that A 
expects to drop his lawsuit and lose (1 - k)a if damages are set at J0; to settle the entire 
lawsuit for Js ≥ paJ1 - ka if damages are J1; and to litigate liability if damages are J2. A 
will sue if the expected value of the latter two outcomes are greater than the cost of 
litigating damages, the price A must pay to learn what damages are. 
Recall that in a unitary trial (where there is no stipulation on damages), A will sue if 
Va(u) = paJa - a ≥ 0 where Ja  is As estimate of expected damages. In this example, Ja  = 
ra0J0 + ra1J1 + ra2J2. It follows that  
 Va - Va(u) = - ra0(paJ0 - ka) + ra1(Js - (paJ1 - ka)) > 0  (22) 
 because (1) the expected value of litigating liability is negative when damages equal J0 
and (2) Js ≥ paJ1 - ka.45 This result has an intuitive explanation. Under reverse 
bifurcation, A has the option to drop his suit and cut his losses if damages turn out to be 
too small to make liability worth litigating. A also expects that for some range of 
damages, he will settle and save the cost of litigating liability. Both factors raise the 
expected value of As claim under reverse bifurcation compared to a unitary trial. 
Next consider the choice between litigating and settling both liability and damages. 
Since expression (22) is positive, As minimum demand is greater under reverse 
bifurcation than under a unitary trial. The difference between Bs maximum settlement 
offer under reverse bifurcation and a unitary trial equals 
 Vb - Vb(u) = -rb0(pbJ0 + kb) - rb1(pbJ1 + kb - Js) < 0. (23)  
Not surprisingly, reverse bifurcation reduces Bs maximum offer because B anticipates 
that A will drop his claim if damages equal J0 which saves B pbJ0 + kb, and that the 
parties will settle liability for an amount less than pbJ1 + kb if damages equal J1.46 Since 
                                                                                                                                                             
44To simplify I assume that the parties split the difference when they settle. Since litigation costs are 
identical Js = (pa + pb)J1/2. 
45If the parties are mutually pessimistic (pa < pb), they will not litigate liability even if damages equal 
J2. Then,  
    Va - Va(u) = - ra0(paJ0 - ka) + ra1(Js1 - (paJ1 - ka)) + ra2(Js2 - (paJ2 - ka)) > 0                   where Js1 
and Js2 equal the settlement if damages turn out to be J1 and J2 respectively. Since each of the settlements 
is ≥ As expected claim if liability is litigated, all three terms above are positive. 
46Under reverse bifurcation, Bs expected loss or maximum settlement offer equals  
    Vb =  rb1(Js) + rb2(pbJ2 + kb) + (1 - k)b 
In a unitary trial, Bs expected loss equals 
    Vb(u) = pb(rb0J0 + rb1J1 + rb2J2) + b. 
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Bs maximum offer falls while As minimum demand increases, the likelihood of 
settling will be less under reverse bifurcation than a unitary trial.  
In short, although reverse bifurcation reduces the cost of litigating a particular case, 
the overall cost of litigation may rise because the number of lawsuits will increase and 
the settlement rate will decrease. The added incentives to sue and to litigate under 
reverse bifurcation will be greater, the greater is ra0 and rb0, the greater the potential 
savings to A and B from As dropping his law suit when J = J0, and the greater the gains 
from settling when J = J1. 
Let me turn briefly to a comparison of ordinary bifurcation (where liability rather 
than damages is litigated first) and reverse bifurcation. Assume that A would sue under 
either form of bifurcation. Since reverse bifurcation holds out the prospect of saving the 
cost of litigating liability while bifurcation holds out the prospect of saving the cost of 
litigating damages, the cost advantage of one over the other depends on (1) the relative 
cost of litigating damages relative to liability and (2) the likelihood of achieving these 
cost savings. In the case of reverse bifurcation, (2) depends on the sum of (a) the 
probability that a trial on damages will yield damages below the minimum amount A 
requires to maintain his suit and (b) the probability that damages will be below the 
threshold that induces the parties to litigate rather than settle assuming mutual 
optimism on liability.47 In the case of ordinary bifurcation, (2) depends positively on (a) 
the probability that the plaintiff loses liability and (b) the lower the degree of mutual 
optimism with respect to damages (given that the plaintiff wins liability).48 
Although both types of bifurcation lead to expected cost savings compared to a 
unitary trial, the same factors that create these cost savings also increase the aggregate 
cost of resolving disputes because they increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will sue 
and that the parties will litigate rather than settle their claim. In sum, the choice between 
ordinary and reverse bifurcation is not obvious. Superficially, one might think the 
choice should be driven by a comparison of the expected cost savings in a particular 
lawsuit, which depends on a comparison of the cost of litigating damages versus 
liability and the likelihood that these costs will be avoided. Such an approach ignores 
the positive relationship between the expected cost savings in a particular suit and the 
aggregate increase in the number of law suits and decrease in the proportion of 
settlements caused by the reduction in expected cost per suit. Indeed, if the latter two 
                                                                                                                                                             
The difference is given by equation (23) in the text. 
47If the the parties are mutually pessimistic with respect to liability, they will never incur the cost of 
litigating liability. After litigating damages, A will either drop his suit or the parties will settle liability. 
Thus, the probability of avoiding the cost of litigating liability equals one. 
48The less the degree of mutual optimism on damages, the more likely the parties will settle damages 
(conditional on A winning liability) and the greater the probability that the cost of litigating damages will 
be avoided. 
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effects dominate, the type of bifurcation that produces the greatest cost savings per case 
could produce the greatest increase in aggregate cost. 
III. Sequential Trials on Many Issues 
I noted in the introduction that bifurcation or separation applies to any dispositive 
issue that can be litigated first, where other issues will be litigated subsequently only if 
the first is decided in a particular way. Imagine, a copyright infringement suit in which 
the court first decides whether the statute of limitation bars the plaintiffs suit. If the 
plaintiff prevails on this issue at summary judgment, the court will then hear evidence 
on the merits of the suit. Or consider a tort suit claiming that a manufacturers product 
causes birth defects in children of parents exposed to the product. By first deciding 
whether the product caused such injuries, issues such as negligence and damages will 
be litigated only if causation is found.49 
Limiting a sequential trial to a single issue (e.g., liability) simplifies the presentation 
but restricts the kinds of questions one asks. Since the boundaries of an issue are 
sometimes arbitrary, one may be able to separate one issue into several narrower 
                                                                                                                                                             
49Separating a single liability issues (in which the remaining liability issues and damages are jointly 
litigated conditional on the plaintiff winning the separated issue) has the same effects on the incentive to 
sue and the choice between settling and going to trial as bifurcating liability and damages. To see this let 
pa = pa1pa2 and pb = pb1pb2 where 1 and 2 denote the two liability issues, and assume there is no 
disagreement on damages (J = Ja = Jb). In a sequential as opposed to a unitary trial, the court will decide 
issue 1 before hearing evidence on issue 2. Working backwards, assume A wins issue 1.  The 
expected value of As claim (conditional on winning issue 1) equals pa1J - (1 - k)a which also represents 
the minimum that A will settle for if he wins issue 1 but before issue 2 has been litigated. Let pb2J + 
(1 - k)b equal Bs expected liability or maximum settlement offer conditional on losing issue 1. The 
parties will settle issue 2 provided pb2J + (1 - k)b ≥ pa2J - (1 - k)a  or (1 - k)(a + b) ≥ pa2J - pb2J. Let Js 
denote the settlement. Then, Va = pa1(pa2J - (1 - k)a) - ka or pa1Js - ka depending upon whether A expects 
to litigate or settle issue 2. (If A is uncertain about whether 2 will be litigated, then Va is a weighted 
average of the last two expressions.) In a unitary trial (where the court decides the case after hearing 
evidence on both issues) the parties will stipulate to 2 provided (1 - k)(a/pa + b/pb) ≥ pa2J - pb2J. Let Js 
also denote the stipulated agreement. Then, Va(u) = pa1Js - ka or pa1pa2J - a depending on whether the 
parties stipulate or litigate issue 2 in a unitary trial. Similarly, Bs expected liability is either Vb(u) = 
pb1Js + kb or pb1pb2J + b depending on whether the parties stipulate or litigate issue 2 in a unitary 
trial. Just as in our analysis of bifurcation, we can divide disputes into three categories (see Figure 1). In 
Category I, there is no difference between a unitary and separate trial because issue 2 is not litigated; in 
Category II, the parties expect to litigate issue 2 in a separate trial (conditional on A winning issue 1) 
but stipulate to issue 2 in a unitary trial; in Category III, the parties litigate issue 2 in both a separate 
and unitary trial. As we showed earlier, there are no systematic differences with respect to As incentive 
to sue and the number of trials for disputes in the first two categories. In Category III, a sequential trial 
increases the expected value of As claim and reduces the expected liability of B compared to a unitary 
trial. Hence a sequential trial increases the number of lawsuits and reduces the settlement rate. 
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issues.50 Consider the above copyright example. In addition to the statute of limitations 
issue, suppose B argues that As copyright is invalid; that he did not copy from A even 
if the copyright is valid; that even if he did copy, he did not copy protected expression 
but took ideas; and even if he copied expression, it was a fair use. Now there are five 
potentially separable liability issues for if the defendant wins on any of them, he wins 
the lawsuit. Separation, therefore, raises several questions. How many issues should be 
separated in a sequential trial? Which issues should be separated? And in what 
sequence should issues be decided? 
A. The Number of Issues to Separate 
Suppose there are n potentially separable (and, therefore, dispositive) issues and 
society desires to minimize the cost of litigation per case without prejudicing either 
party (i.e., without affecting the probability the plaintiff or defendant prevails in the 
litigation).51 How many of the n issues should be decided separately before litigating 
the remaining issues together? And given the number of issues decided separately, 
what is the optimal sequence in which to litigate them? 
Let  pi = the probability the plaintiff prevails on the ith issue (i = 1,...,n); ci = the cost 
of the ith issue when it is litigated jointly with other issues; and fi = the additional cost 
when the ith issue is litigated separately where fi ≥ 0 measures diseconomies from 
separation. If fi = 0, there are no diseconomies so it cost the same to litigate an issue 
separately or jointly with other issues. If there are additional costs associated with 
deciding an issue separately (e.g., such as the cost of repeating evidence or the extra cost 
of deliberating and deciding an issue separately compared to the cost of deciding it with 
other issues), then fi > 0 and it costs more to litigate an issue separately. For example, 
suppose c1, c2 and c3 each equal $1, and it cost $.10 to decide each issue separately but 
                                                                                                                                                             
50Indeed, one may be able to subdivide issues ad infinitum although the restriction that each issue be 
dispositive may limit this process. In this section, therefore, I am not addressing the case of the plaintiff 
who brings multiple claims against the defendant where the claims may be separated and one or more 
disposed of (say on summary judgment) without disposing of the remaining claims. I focus on separating 
issues in a given claim where each issue is dispositive (i.e., if the plaintiff loses an issue, he loses the case). 
I add, however, that separating claims can be dispositive in some instances. For example, the plaintiff 
may choose to drop his entire suit if certain claims are thrown out on summary judgment. This is 
analogous to my analysis of reverse bifurcation where litigating damages may be dispositive because if 
damages turn out to be low, the plaintiff drops his case. 
51I put to one side the effects that lower litigation costs per case has on the number of lawsuits and 
the choice between settling and litigating. Obviously, the effects are similar to our analysis of bifurcation 
since a sequential trial on n issues tends to increase the value of the plaintiffs claim and reduce the 
settlement rate. I add that the cost savings from a sequential trial that includes issues that go to the merits 
of the case may be small. Once a trial begins, there is unlikely to be sufficient delay between many of the 
issues to defer the costs of preparation. Then, minimizing total litigation costs is roughly consistent with 
maximizing social welfare since the number of suits and the settlement/trial choice may remain 
approximately constant. 
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only $.10 to decide them jointly. Then fi = .10 and it costs $3.10 to litigate the three issues 
together ($.10 + $3.00), $3.20 to litigate one issue separately and the other two together 
($1.10 + $2.10), and $3.30 to litigate each separately.52  
Initially, I assume that the plaintiff has an equal probability of prevailing on each 
issue and that the cost of litigating and deciding each issue is identical (i.e., ci = c and fi = 
f for all issues). This assumption allows me to abstract from the question of the optimal 
sequence in which to litigate different issues (since I show later that the probability and 
cost affect the sequence) and to focus on how many issues to separate.53  
Assume we separate m issues (m ≤ n - 1).54 Expected litigation costs equal 
 C(m) = (1 - pm)(f + c)/(1 - p) + pm[f + (n - m)c] (24) 
 where pm is the probability of the plaintiff prevailing on m issues (and, therefore, the 
probability the plaintiff wins the case).55 C(m) is increasing in p (provided m > 0) 
because the greater is p, the greater the likelihood that each issue will be litigated. 
Separating an additional issue affects cost as follows: 
 C(m + 1) - C(m) = pm[pf - (1 - p)(n - m - 1)c]. (25)  
If separation creates no diseconomies (i.e., f = 0), the term in brackets in (25) will be 
negative (since m - 1 < n ) and C(m) will decline as m increases. Since it costs the same to 
litigate an issue separately and jointly, the only effect of separating an additional issue is 
to increase the probability that the remaining issues will not be litigated (because there 
is a positive probability (1 - p) that the plaintiff will lose that issue) which lowers 
                                                                                                                                                             
52One cannot litigate two issues separately and the third jointly because there are only three issues. 
53By assuming there are n dispositive issues, I am implicitly assuming that each issue cannot be 
subdivided into additional dispositive issues for possible separation. 
54If all n issues are separated, m will equal (n - 1) because separating (n - 1) issues leaves one 
additional issue which, if litigated, must be tried separately since all prior issues have been litigated. 
Hence the maximum value for m is (n - 1) 
55We can derive (24) as follows. Suppose m issues are separated. The expected cost of litigating the 
first issue is f + c; the expected cost of the second issue is pf + c (i.e., its cost multiplied by the 
probability it will be litigated); the expected cost of third issue is p2f + c and so forth. Thus, the 
expected cost of m separate issues equals f + c(1 + p + p2 + ..+pm-1). Multiplying and dividing by (1 - p) 
yields the first term in equation (24). The second term equals the expected cost of litigating the remaining 
issues jointly which equals the probability (pm) that these issues will be litigated multiplied by their cost 
which equals (n - m)c plus f. I am assuming, therefore, that the cost of deliberating and deciding a single 
issue is identical to the cost of deciding a group of issues  i.e., if it costs $.10 to decide a single issue, it 
costs $.10 to decide a group of issues. Although  unrealistic, this assumption simplifies the analysis. 
Alternatively, I could allow the cost of deciding issues to increase with the number of issues jointly 
decided but at a decreasing rate so that there are still diseconomies from separation  e.g., it cost $.10 to 
decide a single issue, $.19 to decide two issues jointly but $.20 to decide them separately, $.27 to decide 
three issues jointly but $.30 to decide them separately, etc. This would complicate the analysis  without 
changing the basic results. Note that if all issues are separated (m = n - 1), the term in brackets in (24) 
equals the cost of the nth issue (or the m + 1 issue) which is [f + c] or the same cost as any other separated 
issue. 
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expected litigation costs. Differently stated, when f = 0, expected litigation costs are 
minimized by litigating each dispositive issue separately. Not surprisingly, 
diseconomies (f > 0) explain why fewer than n issues are separated. Then, the greater f 
and the greater m, the more likely that separating an additional issue will increase 
expected litigation cost. C will be minimized at m* when separating one more or one 
less issue increases C (i.e., C(m* + 1) > C(m*) and C(m* - 1) > C(m*)). As a first 
approximation, this occurs when  pf - (1 - p)(n - m - 1)c  0 for then the marginal cost of 
separating an additional issue (i.e., the probability an additional issue will be litigated 
times the added cost of litigating it separately) approximately equals its marginal 
benefits (i.e., the probability that the remaining issues will not be litigated times their 
cost).56  
B. The Ordering of Issues 
Now consider the ordering of issues in a sequential trial. In the prior example, 
ordering was irrelevant because all issues had identical costs and identical probabilities 
of the plaintiff winning. Now suppose issues j and k are both separated but their costs 
and probabilities differ. Which should be litigated first? One can show that if 
 (fj +cj)/(1 - pj) < (fk +ck)/(1 - pk)  (26) 
 expected litigation cost will be lower if issue j is litigated before k. If inequality (26) is 
reversed, k should be litigated before j.57 Inequality (26) is more likely to hold the lower 
                                                                                                                                                             
56Two corner solutions should be noted. If pf is everywhere less than (1 - p)(n - m - 1)c, diseconomies 
are so small that all n issues should be separated. If pf is everywhere greater than (1 - p)(n - m - 1)c, 
diseconomies are so great that all issues should be litigated together. 
An alternative formulation of (25) assumes that there are n issues of unit length but each can be 
continuously subdivided so that n is a continuous function over the interval [0,n]. Then (25) becomes 
 (i) C(m) =
x=0
∫ 
m
px(f + c + c)dx + pm[f + (n - m)c] 
Minimizing C with respect to m yields the equivalent of (25) or  
 (ii) ∂C(m)/∂m = pm(f + c)+ pmlog p[f + (n - m)c] - pmc = 0. 
Since log p- (1 - p), (ii) can be rewritten as 
 (iii) ∂C(m)/∂m = pmpf - (1 - p)(n - m)c] = 0  
which is nearly identical to (25) and the condition for minimizing expected cost in the discrete case 
described in the text. Although the continuous case yields an optimal number of issues (of unit length) to 
separate, it leaves indeterminate the question of subdividing each unit length issue into further issues. 
57Suppose m issues are separated, j and k are adjacent issues and neither is the last issue separated. 
(The last separated issue raises an additional problem that I examine shortly.) Let C(m)jk and C(m)kj 
denote respectively expected litigation cost when j is litigated before k and k before j. We can write 
 (i) C(m)jk = (f1 + c1) + p1(f2 + c2) + p1p2(f3 + c3)+...+ p1p2......pj-1(fj + cj) + p1p2..pj-1pj 
  (fk + ck) + p1p2..pj-1pjpk(fk+1 + ck+1) + ....   
 (ii) C(m)kj = (f1 + c1) + p1(f2 + c2) + p1p2(f3 + c3)+...+ p1p2......pj-1(fk + ck) + p1p2..pj-1pk 
  (fj + cj) + p1p2..pj-1pkpj(f + ck+1) + ..... 
Canceling common terms yields C(m)jk < C(m)kj if 
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is the cost of issue j relative to k, and the greater is the probability of losing issue j 
relative to losing k. By making pair wise comparisons among separated issues one can 
determine the sequence that minimizes litigation costs. Intuitively, expression (26) 
implies that issues that are less costly and have the greatest probability of ending the 
litigation should be litigated earliest. At least with respect to the first component (fi+ ci), 
this seems roughly consistent with practice. Procedural issues, which are likely to be 
less costly to litigate and decide, are often separated and disposed of at the pleading 
stage.58  
Deciding which should be the last issue separated raises a special problem because if 
the plaintiff loses that issue, the cost saving is not just the cost of the next issue (as in the 
case of ordering issues j and k in (26)) but the cost of all issues litigated jointly.59 
Suppose we plan to separate m + 1 (< n - 1) issues; m have already been selected and 
ordered according to their values (fi +ci)/(1 - pi); and we want to separate one more 
issue from the remaining n - m issues.60 Suppose j and k have not yet been separated. 
We would separate j rather than k if 
 (fj +cj) + pj(f + Cn-m - cj) < (fk +ck) + pk(f + Cn-m - ck) (27)  
where Cn-m denotes the sum of the cost of the n - m remaining issues (which includes 
both cj and ck) and f denotes the cost of jointly deciding (n - m - 1) issues.61 assuming 
that cost does not depend on whether j or k is decided jointly. Observe that the cost of 
the last issue separated has two components: a direct cost (either (fj +cj) or (fk +ck)) and 
an expected cost equal to the probability the plaintiff prevails on this issue times the 
cost of jointly litigating the remaining issues. 
I add several further points. 
1. Suppose litigating j before k satisfies inequality (26) when both j and k are 
separated. If only one but not both of the issues is separated, it is possible that 
separating k rather than j will yield lower costs. A switch can occur because greater 
weight is given to the probability the plaintiff loses in selecting the last issue than in 
selecting earlier issues . To see this, rewrite (26) as (fj +cj)+ pj(fk + ck) < (fk +ck) + pk(fj + cj) 
                                                                                                                                                             
 (iii) (fj + cj) + pj(fk + ck) < (fk + ck) + pk(fj + cj)  
Rearranging terms yields inequality (26) in the text. 
58Just as in the analysis of bifurcation, I note that the disposing of cases at the pleadings stage 
increases the incentive of the plaintiff to sue and reduces the incentives to settle out of court at the outset. 
Whether these factors would be sufficient to offset the effect of separation on lower the cost per litigated 
case is unclear. 
59When neither j or k is the last issue separated, the probability of litigating the nonseparated issues 
equals p1p2...pjpk...pm when j comes before k, and p1p2...pkpj...pm when k comes before j. Given the 
assumption of independence, the two probabilities are equal. 
60Note that (fm +cm)/(1 - pm) is less than the corresponding value for each of the n - m remaining 
issues. 
61I assume that f is the same whether j or k is decided jointly. 
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and note that (f + Cn-m - cj) > fk + ck and (f + Cn-m - ck) > fj + cj provided two or more 
issues are litigated jointly and f ≥ fj and fk. Therefore, even if fj + cj < fk + ck but pk < pj,  
issue j could come first when separating both because fj + cj < fk + ck dominates; yet k 
could come before j when separating only one because the probability difference (which 
is weighted by the cost of litigating the remaining issues jointly) dominates. 
2. Imagine there are many potentially dispositive issues but only a single issue is 
separated while the others are jointly decided (providing the plaintiff wins the 
separated issue). Rewriting (27), one finds that expected litigation costs are minimized 
by separating the issue which yields the lowest value for 
  E(Ci) = (fi + ci)(1 - pi) + pi(fi + f + C)  (28)  
where C = ∑ci where i = 1,...n. Note that (28) is an average of the two possible cost 
outcomes, (fi + ci) if the plaintiff loses i and (fi + f + C) if the plaintiff wins i, weighted by 
their respective probabilities. Since C > ci, the issue most likely to satisfy (28) is one 
where both ci and pi are low relative to the other issues.  
3. One can determine the optimal number (m*) of issues to separate when their costs 
and probabilities differ by comparing expected litigation costs for different values of m 
assuming that issues are optimally ordered for each value of m. Similar to the example 
where all issues have identical ps and cs, m* would occur where both C(m*+ 1) and 
C(m*- 1) > C(m*).  
4. I have greatly simplified the analysis of separation by assuming that both the 
probability the plaintiff prevails on an issue and its cost are independent of the ordering 
of issues or whether they are separated. This is a useful approximation for it allows one 
to focus on the importance of probabilities and costs in determining the optimal 
sequence and number of issues to separate. Since these factors are critical determinants 
of expected litigation cost and the potential cost saving from separation, they are likely 
to play a similar role in a more complicated model of separation. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I first analyze the effect on litigation of a sequential or bifurcated trial 
on liability and damages as opposed to a unitary trial on both issues. Bifurcation is a 
special case of the more general problem of separating issues for trial. Thus, I also 
analyze the effects of a sequential trial on many dispositive issues in which each issue is 
decided after it is argued rather than at the end of the case. The main findings of my 
analysis are as follows. 
1. Bifurcating liability and damages tends to lower the expected cost of litigating a 
given dispute compared to a unitary trial because the cost of litigating damages will be 
saved if the plaintiff loses liability. This expected cost reduction increases the expected 
value of each potential plaintiffs claim which increases both his incentive to sue and the 
minimum sum he will accept to settle rather than litigate his case. Less obviously, 
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bifurcation reduces the defendants expected loss from litigation and so reduces his 
maximum settlement offer. In short, the net effect of bifurcation on total litigation costs 
is uncertain. Although bifurcation lowers the expected cost of litigating a given dispute, 
it increases the number of plaintiffs who sue and the fraction of cases that go to trial. If 
the first factor dominates, bifurcation will lower aggregate costs; if the latter two factors 
dominate, bifurcation will increase aggregate costs. 
2. These findings are subject to several qualifications. First, if differences in the 
parties estimates of damages is less that the relevant cost of litigating damages, the 
parties will find it mutually beneficial to stipulate to damages in a unitary trial and 
settle damages (conditional of the plaintiff winning liability) in a bifurcated trial. In this 
case, a unitary trial approximates the outcome of a bifurcated trial because, in both, only 
liability is litigated. Thus, the added incentive to sue and to litigate under bifurcation 
occurs for those disputes in which the parties neither stipulate or settle damages. 
Second, if bifurcation causes cost diseconomies that are larger than the expected cost 
savings described above, then it can lead to fewer suits and a higher settlement rate 
than for unitary trials. Bifurcation, however, may sometimes create economies not 
diseconomies. For example, if the defendant brings a counterclaim for damages, 
bifurcation may eliminate litigation on one of the damage claims compared to a unitary 
trial that litigates both claims. Economies from bifurcation would reinforce the 
conclusions in 1 above. Third, bifurcation may lower rather than raise the expected 
value of the plaintiffs claim if it lowers the plaintiffs probability of prevailing 
(weighted by expected damages) by more than it lowers his expected litigation cost . 
This might arise if a jury is more favorably disposed to a plaintiffs liability claim when 
it hears evidence on damages that would be excluded in the liability phase of a 
bifurcated trial. Then, bifurcation would lead to fewer (not more) lawsuits but a lower 
settlement rate than for unitary trials.  
3. Reverse bifurcationwhere damages are tried before liabilityhas similar effects 
as ordinary bifurcation. Damages may be a dispositive issue because if a court finds low 
damages, the plaintiff may drop his case or be more willing to settle liability. Hence, 
reverse bifurcation creates expected cost savings which lead to more suits and a lower 
settlement rate. The net effect of reverse bifurcation (compared to unitary trials) on 
aggregate litigation costs depends on the importance of the latter two factors relative to 
the expected cost saving per litigated case. 
4. A sequential trial may involve many potentially dispositive issues. This leads to 
two related questions. How many dispositive issues should be separated? And which 
issues should be separated and in what order? With respect to the first question, 
litigation costs (per case) will be minimized when the marginal cost of separating an 
additional issue (which equals the probability the issue will be litigated multiplied by 
the added cost of deciding it separately) equals its marginal benefit (which equals the 
reduction in the probability that the remaining issues will be litigated times their cost). 
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With respect to the second question, issues should be ordered by comparing the cost of 
deciding an issue separately and the probability that the plaintiff wins the issues. The 
lower the cost and the lower the probability, the greater the benefits from separating 
that issue and the earlier it should be litigated.  
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